

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00193 01 OF 02 171808Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-07 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00

DODE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 /100 W  
----- 058945

P R 171645Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0960

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0193

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK PRESS CONFERENCE,  
APRIL 17, 1975

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR STRULAK, HEAD OF THE POLISH DELEGATION, PRESENTED EASTERN END-OF-ROUND ASSESSMENT. BETWEEN 30-35 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED. STRULAK STATEMENT SHOWED SENSITIVITY ABOUT ALLIED OPPOSITION, REFLECTED IN WESTERN PRESS, TO EASTERN "FREEZE" AND "NEW PROPOSALS" MOVES FIRST PUBLICIZED IN NEGOTIATING ROUND JUST CONCLUDED. HE CONTENDED THAT EASTERN MOVES HAVE SHOWN "INITIATIVE" AND "FLEXIBILITY" SO FAR NOT RECIPROCATED BY WEST. STRULAK FELT THAT THIS HAS IMPEDED TALKS, BUT EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT SUCH CONSISTENT INPUT ON THE PART OF THE EAST "IS BOUND TO BRING ABOUT THE OUTPUT". HIS STATEMENT REPEATED  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00193 01 OF 02 171808Z

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EASTERN PROPOSALS AND TRIED TO

DENIGRATE WESTERN MOVES IN THE TALKS. STRULAK NOTED IMPORTANCE OF TALKS, IMPLIED THAT WEST MUST HAVE INTEREST IN DETENTE, AND ASSURED "PUBLIC OPINION" THAT EAST WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MOVE TALKS FORWARD. TEXT OF STRULAK STATEMENT FOLLOWS. FOLLOW-UP Q'S AND A'S WHICH FOCUSSED ON EASTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO EXCHANGE DATA WILL BE SENT SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE PRESS,

HAVING FOLLOWED THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND FREQUENTLY COMMENTED ON THEM, YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO REPORT TO YOU TODAY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED A MAJOR PROGRESS.

2. YET, IF YOU ASKED ME TO ASSESS THIS ROUND IN ONE SENTENCE, I SHOULD SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN THE TIME OF INCESSANT INITIATIVE AND EFFORTS BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AIMED AT OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULTIES EXISTING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FINDING SOME WAY TOWARDS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THOUGH OUR FLEXIBILITY HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CONSTANT INPUT OF INITIATIVE AND EFFORT ON OUR PART IS BOUND TO BRING ABOUT THE OUTPUT.

3. AS YOU WILL RECALL, SOON AFTER THIS ROUND HAD STARTED, THE PUBLIC OPINION CAME TO KNOW ABOUT THE IMPORTANT PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES : CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, SOVIET UNION AND POLAND PROVIDING FOR A JOINT COMMITMENT OF THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE VIENNA TALKS NOT TO INCREASE THE MANPOWER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SIMPLE COMMITMENT, SEEMING ALMOST NATURAL TO PARTIES NEGOTIATING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, WAS MEANT TO START ON A NOTE OF QUICK ACCORD, PUT AN EVIDENT HALT TO TENDENCIES FOR ARMAMENTS RACE IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND THUS FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. NO DOUBT, IT WOULD BE HAILED AS IMPORTANT FOR THE GENERAL PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE BY ALL THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00193 01 OF 02 171808Z

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THIS PROCESS.

4. AS YOU KNOW, THERE HAS BEEN A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL ON THE PART OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS. THE MAJOR ARGUMENT AGAINST IT, ALSO TAKEN OVER BY SOME WESTERN PAPERS, WAS THE ALLEGED FREEZE-EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED COMMITMENT IN RESPECT OF THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

5. BUT THIS IS THE CRITICISM WHICH GROSSLY MISSES THE POINT. FIRST, WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND, IS TO PREVENT THE INCREASE OF FORCES, NOT THEIR DECREASE. SECOND, THIS WOULD BE CLEARLY AN INTERIM COMMITMENT, TO BE REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THIRD, THE RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY.

6. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER THE IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY AND TEMPORARY NON-INCREASE ACCORD, AND OUR PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT, TO BE A STANDING ONE, AND OFFERING GOOD CHANCES OF FURTHER PROGRESS.

7. OF COURSE, WHAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. SOON AFTER THESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, NOW ABOUT ONE AND A HALF YEAR AGO, THE COMPLETE DRAFT OF SUCH AGREEMENT WAS PUT FORWARD BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES-ON 8 NOVEMBER, 1973. IT PROPOSED TO REDUCE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF 3 YEARS - UNTIL THE END OF 1977.

8. THE SUGGESTED METHOD OF REDUCTION BY EQUAL PERCENTAGE FULLY CORRESPONDS WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS PLEDGED TO RESPECT, NAMELY THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY PARTY TO THE FUTURE REDUCTION PROGRAMME. THE SOCIALIST DRAFT AGREEMENT GIVES THE CLEAR PICTURE OF EACH PARTICIPANT'S OBLIGATIONS AND EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE REDUCTION PROCESS. IT IS CONCRETE IN TERMS AND TIMING.

9. AS YOU KNOW, IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND WE HAVE MADE A MAJOR MOVE OF INTRODUCING SOME AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT. THEY CONCERN TWO OUT OF THE THREE STAGES OF REDUCTION PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, THAT IS THE REDUCTIONS IN 1975 AND IN 1976.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00193 01 OF 02 171808Z

10. IN 1975 WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SEVEN WESTERN STATES /USA, UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, BELGIUM, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBURG AND THE NETHERLANDS/ AND OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES /USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR AND POLAND/ BY THE TOTAL OF 20 THOUSAND MEN ON EACH

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00193 02 OF 02 171840Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-07 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00

DODE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 /100 W

----- 059309

P R 171645Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0961

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0193

FROM US REP MBFR

WE BELIEVE THAT CONFIDENCE HAS TO BE MUTUAL AND IS TO BE CREATED BY REDUCTIONS OF ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA BUT ONE MAY NOW SAY THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE SOVIET UNION IN PARTICULAR, ARE TAKING A MAJOR STEP TO INVEST EARLIER AND MORE INTO THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE - THROUGH PRIOR AND GREATER REDUCTIONS.

11. YOU MAY RECALL THAT THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED A CRUCIAL ONE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN STATES INSISTED THAT SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS SHOULD PRECEDE THOSE OF THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AS A NECESSARY ASSURANCE. THIS VIEW BEING REGARDED BY US AS TOTALLY UNFOUNDED, IT IS NEVERTHELESS LARGELY MET IN OUR LATEST PROPOSALS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT A COMPROMISE ANSWER HAS BEEN NOW PROVIDED TO THE QUESTION: WHO SHOULD REDUCE FIRST?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00193 02 OF 02 171840Z

12. I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT GIVEN THIS MANIFESTATION OF GOOD WILL ON THE PART OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IT IS DOUBLY HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

AND CANADA CONTINUE TO BALK FROM DECLARING, IN CLEAR TERMS, THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS.

13. I BELIEVE THAT THESE CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR PROPOSALS OF 6 MARCH 1975 SUFFICE TO REFUTE THE RASH COMMENT WHICH APPEARED IN SOME WESTERN PAPERS TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE WERE BUT PROCEDURAL MOVES. THE ISSUES OF TIMING, SEQUENCE AND AMOUNT OF REDUCTION ARE NO PROCEDURAL ISSUES. READINESS TO TAKE ADVANCE STEP OF REDUCING SOME TENS OF THOUSAND OF TROOPS IS NOT A PROCEDURAL MOVE.

14. IT IS TO BE SINCERELY REGRETTED THAT THESE SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPROMISE MOVES BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE, AS YET, NEITHER MET A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE NOR RESULTED IN ANY COUNTER-PROPOSAL. IF TAKEN UP AND RECIPROCATED, THEY WOULD DEFINITELY MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. UNFORTUNATELY, WESTERN POSITION IN THIS ROUND HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED.

15. WE CONTINUE TO BE FACED WITH THE FIRM REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS - TOGETHER WITH ALL THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES THAT ARE READY TO DO SO. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN USSR, POLAND, GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS, SUCH AS EVASION ON THE PART OF THESE WESTERN STATES CONCERNING, AMONG OTHERS, THE LARGEST COMPONENT OF THE NATO IN THE AREA - THAT OF THE WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES - INDEED BLOCKS THE WAY TO AN AGREEMENT.

16. WE ARE FURTHER CONFRONTED WITH DEMANDS TO CHANGE THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES THROUGH ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, SUPPORTED BY ARTIFICIAL, SELECTIVE AND THEREFORE UNOBJECTIVE ARGUMENTS OF SO-CALLED DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES AND IN GEOGRAPHY. BUT THESE DEMANDS, IN FACT, CONVEY TENDENCIES TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. THE OBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NOT JUST SINGLING OUT GROUND FORCES ALONE, INDICATES THE EXISTENCE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM, RECOGNIZED ALSO BY UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00193 02 OF 02 171840Z

THE WESTERN OFFICIAL SOURCES. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS WORK NOT ONLY EASTWARD BUT WESTWARD, AND WERE FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS AGREED UPON.

17. OUR WELL FOUNDED AND REPEATED DEMANDS TO INCLUDE INTO REDUCTION THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE AIR FORCE AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA, REMAIN UNANSWERED. WE ARE PUZZLED BY THE EVIDENT DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THE WELL ARTICULATED TREND OF OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE IN FAVOUR OF THE REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TOTAL

SILENCE ON THIS MATTER.

18. WE ARE SURPRISED BY THE STRESS EVIDENTLY PUT BY SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES ON A REDUCTION ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE SO-CALLED COMMON CEILING WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY ENABLE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. SUCH A TENDENCY CLEARLY RUNS COUNTER TO THE VERY IDEA OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE EQUALITY AND MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT NO PARTY TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE STEPS UNDERMINING THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

19. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT PROPOSE FOR ANY COUNTRY TO UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATION WHICH THEY THEMSELVES WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE, BUT SO ALSO THEY DO NOT SEE ANY BASIS FOR GRANTING PARTICULAR PRIVILEGES TO ANY COUNTRY.

20. IN SHORT, THE DISCUSSION IN THIS ROUND HAS NOT ALLOWED US TO DISCERN ANY NEW ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN POSITION.

21. BUT WE ARE NOT DISCOURAGED. IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH OUR GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER TO BE GREATLY IMPORTANT, WE HAVE PRESENTED A SERIES OF PROPOSALS. THEY ARE:

A. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 AS NOW AMENDED AND COMPLETED;

B. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975, WHICH, THOUGH NOW IDENTICAL WITH THE FIRST STAGE OF OUR COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT, ALSO REMAINS AS A SEPARATE ONE, SHOULD THIS BE PREFERABLE TO OUR WESTERN PARTNERS;

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00193 02 OF 02 171840Z

C. THE PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION BY THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON NON-INCREASING THE MANPOWER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

22. THESE PARALLEL PROPOSALS DO DEMONSTRATE NOT ONLY OUR INTEREST TO BRING ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT OUR GOOD WILL AND EARNEST DESIRE TO FIND SOLUTIONS WHICH ARE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. THEY REFLECT OUR READINESS TO SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT EITHER ON A PARTIAL OR GENERAL BASIS.

23. WE REALIZE HOW MUCH IS AT STAKE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS - NOT ONLY MILITARILY BUT ALSO POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND EVEN PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

24. THINKING, AS WE DO, IN TERMS OF DETENTE, IN TERMS MAKING IT IRREVERSIBLE, SUPPLEMENTED BY MEASURES OF MILITARY

DETENTE, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND OUR DELEGATIONS HERE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO SUCCEED.

25. WE ARE NOT WITHOUT ASSETS. OURS AND OUR PARTNERS INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS A MAJOR ONE.

26. IN THE VIENNA TALKS THIS IS SIGNIFIED BY THE SERIOUSNESS, THE INTENSITY AND THE MATTER-OF-FACT CHARACTER OF OUR DISCUSSION. THIS DISCUSSION, THOUGH DIFFICULT, CONTINUES TO BE CARRIED IN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE.

27. WE HAVE THE IMPORTANT AND CONTINUOUSLY VALID BASIS OF AGREEMENT WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS ACHIEVED PRIOR TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS: ON PRINCIPLES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND MUTUALITY; ON THE CIRCLE OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; ON THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS; ON THE REDUCTION AREA, AND ON THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

28. THE PUBLIC OPINION MAY REST CONFIDENT THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL MAKE THEIR UTMOST IN ASSURING ESSENTIAL PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS. IF EQUALLY GOOD WILL OF THE WESTERN STATES RESULTS IN THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE, WE MAY BE EXPECTED TO MOVE FORWARD. END TEXT.RESOR

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MBFR, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS CONFERENCES, MILITARY POLICIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 17 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00193  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750135-0171  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750442/aaaabmzv.tel  
**Line Count:** 353  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 JUL 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <01 JUL 2003 by SilvaL0>; APPROVED <29 JAN 2004 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 17, 1975  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, (STRULAK, TADEUSZ)  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006